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Abstract Ouyang et al. proposed an (n, n) threshold quantum secret sharing
scheme, where the number of participants is limited to n = 4k + 1, k ∈ Z+,
and the security evaluation of the scheme was carried out accordingly. In this
paper, we propose an (n, n) threshold quantum secret sharing scheme for the
number of participants n in any case ( n ∈ Z+ ). The scheme is based on a
quantum circuit, which consists of Clifford group gates and Toffoli gate. We
study the properties of the quantum circuit in this paper and use the quantum
circuit to analyze the security of the scheme for dishonest participants.
Keywords Secret sharing scheme · Quantum circuit · Quantum computa-
tion · Unitary matrix
1 Introduction
Quantum computing is a new type of computing mode that regulates quantum
information and follows the laws of quantum mechanics. That is, it enables
quantum bits to achieve the purpose of programming in different quantum
logic gates sequentially, and all kinds of quantum algorithms can be realized
by combining different quantum logic gates. From the perspective of computa-
tional efficiency, because of the existence of quantum mechanical superposition,
some quantum algorithms are faster than the conventional general computer
when solving problems.
In the field of quantum cryptography, aside from the quantum key distri-
bution[1,2], the quantum computation of security computing has attracted the
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attention of people, such as secure multiparty computation [3], blind compu-
tation [4-7] and verifiable delegated computation [8-12]. The earliest quantum
algorithm is proposed by Jozsa and Deutsch. This quantum algorithm shows
the computing power that classical computers do not have [13]. Ouyang et al.
give a different way of security computing quantum algorithm [14], and the
security evaluation of quantum secret sharing circuit.
In 1999, Hillery [15] and others proposed a quantum secret sharing scheme
firstly. The emergence of this concept provides an effective way for the secu-
rity of quantum state secrets. After that, the quantum secret sharing scheme
has received rapid attention and development [16-22]. The so-called (k, n)-
threshold quantum secret sharing scheme will mean the quantum state secret
distributed to n participants such that no group fewer than k participants
can reconstruct the secret quantum state [23-25], and any k participants can
reconstruct the secret quantum state.
In the quantum circuits, the implementation of the unitary transformation
of the quantum state is equivalent to the role of the logic gate in the quan-
tum state. In any dimension Hilbert space, if the unitary transformation of
the corresponding quantum state can be realized through the combination of
elements in a logic gate group, we call such a logic gate group a universal
logic gate group (universal gate), hereinafter referred to as universal gate. It
has been proved that Toffoli gates can realize all unitary transformation [26]
in any dimension Hilbert space, but it is a 3 qubits quantum gate, which is
difficult from the perspective of physical realization. However, in any case, the
universal gates of quantum computing, like the classical logic gate group, have
different forms of expression, as the Ref.[27] points out that any of the T gate,
the controlled phase gate and the Toffoli gate and Clifford group gates can
form a group of universal gate. In this regard, Ouyang et al. considers the
universal gate composed of discrete Clifford group gates and T gate [14].
In this paper, we consider the situation that Clifford group gates and Toffoli
gate constitute a universal gate, and propose an (n, n) threshold quantum
secret sharing scheme for any positive integer n. Then we use the quantum
circuit composed of discrete Clifford group gates and Toffoli gate to evaluate
the security.
2 Quantum circuit and its related conclusions
In this section,we introduce a quantum circuit (See Fig.1, Fig.2) with a proof
of security and give corresponding conclusions of the quantum circuit.
In Fig.1, the first s qubits of the first column qubits are the quantum state
secrets to be shared, and the later t qubits are the ancilla to help implement
the Toffoli gate. The notation ax,y labels the qubit on the x-th row and the y-
th column, and Rx labels the qubits in the x-th row, where x ∈ {1, 2, ···, s}, y ∈
{1, 2, · · ·, n+ 1}.
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Fig. 1: Secret sharing process corresponding to n+ 1 participants
In Fig.2, U represents the unitary matrix on the x-th row of qubits Rx in
Fig.1. When i ∈ {1, 2, ···, n}, Vi represents the corresponding unitary matrix of
the i column, and we order A = VnVn−1 ···V1. Wi represents the corresponding
unitary matrix of the n+ i column, and we order B = WnWn−1 · · ·W1, then
U = BA.
Fig. 2: Schematic diagram of the corresponding circuit of n+ 1 participants
According the quantum circuit given in Fig.1 and Fig.2, we give the fol-
lowing two properties.
Property 1 when n is an odd number,
U(σ ⊗ I⊗n−1)U† = σ⊗n, (1)
where σ ∈ P = {I,X, Y, Z}.
Prove For σ = I,X, Y, Z, we give a proof of (1) respectively. That is, we
prove the following equations are set up
U(I ⊗ I⊗n−1)U† = I⊗n, (2)
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U(X ⊗ I⊗n−1)U† = X⊗n, (3)
U(Y ⊗ I⊗n−1)U† = Y ⊗n, (4)
U(Z ⊗ I⊗n−1)U† = Z⊗n, (5)
Firstly, by U = BA, it is easy to know that the above Eq.(2) is clearly
established when σ = I . Next, the cases of σ = {X,Y, Z} are proved by
mathematical induction.
When σ = X, we prove Eq.(3) to be established. First,the following Eq.(6)
is established.
A(X ⊗ I⊗n−1)A† = X⊗n, n ∈ Z+. (6)
where A = |0〉〈0| ⊗ I⊗n−1 + |1〉〈1| ⊗X⊗n−1
A(X ⊗ I⊗n−1)A†
= (|0〉〈0| ⊗ I⊗n−1 + |1〉〈1| ⊗X
⊗
n−1)(X ⊗ I⊗n−1)
(|0〉〈0| ⊗ I⊗n−1 + |1〉〈1| ⊗X⊗n−1)
= |0〉〈1| ⊗ I⊗n−1 + |1〉〈0| ⊗X⊗n−1 = X⊗n.
It is easy to know that when n = 3, 5, Eq.(3) is held, so we assumed that Eq.(3)
is established when n = 2k+ 1, next certificate that Eq.(3) is also established
when n = 2k + 3. According hypothesis and Eq.(6) we know that
B = W2kW2k−1 · · ·W1,
U(X ⊗ I⊗2k)U† = X⊗2k+1,
A′(X ⊗ I⊗2k+2)(A′)† = X⊗2k+3.
When n = 2k + 3,
B′ = W ′2k+2W
′
2k+1W
′
2kW
′
2k−1 · · ·W ′1
= W ′2k+2W
′
2k+1(W2k ⊗ I ⊗ I) · · · (W1 ⊗ I ⊗ I)
= W ′2k+2W
′
2k+1(W2k ⊗ · · · ⊗W1 ⊗ I ⊗ I)
= W ′2k+2W
′
2k+1(B ⊗ I ⊗ I),
where
W ′2k+2 = I ⊗ I⊗2k ⊗ |0〉〈0| ⊗ I +X ⊗ I⊗2k ⊗ |1〉〈1| ⊗ I,
W ′2k+1 = I ⊗ I⊗2k ⊗ I ⊗ |0〉〈0|+X ⊗ I⊗2k ⊗ I ⊗ |1〉〈1|.
then
U ′(X ⊗ I⊗2k+2)(U ′)†
= B′A′(X ⊗ I⊗2k+2)(A′)†(B′)†
= B′(X⊗2k+3)(B′)†
= W ′2k+2W
′
2k+1(X
⊗2k+3)(W ′2k+1)
†(W ′2k+2)
†
= X⊗2k+1 ⊗ (|0〉〈1| ⊗X + |1〉〈0| ⊗X)
= X⊗2k+3.
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It is known that the Eq.(3) holds according the inductive hypothesis.
When σ = Y , we prove Eq.(4) to be established. Firstly, we suppose Y =
|1〉〈0|− |0〉〈1|, and it is clear from Y = i|1〉〈0|− i|0〉〈1| that it is also true. The
same reason has the next form
A(Y ⊗ I⊗n−1)A† = Y ⊗X⊗n−1, n ∈ Z+. (7)
It is easy to know that when n = 3, 5, Eq.(4) is held, so we assumed that Eq.(4)
is established when n = 2k+ 1, next certificate that Eq.(4) is also established
when n = 2k + 3. According hypothesis and Eq.(7) wo know that
B = W2kW2k−1 · · ·W1,
U(Y ⊗ I⊗2k)U† = Y ⊗2k+1,
A′(Y ⊗ I⊗2k+2)(A′)† = Y ⊗X⊗2k+2.
When n = 2k + 3,
U ′(Y ⊗ I⊗2k+2)(U ′)†
= B′(Y ⊗X⊗2k+2)(B′)†
= W ′2k+2W
′
2k+1(Y
⊗2k+1 ⊗X ⊗X)(W ′2k+1)†(W ′2k+2)†
= Y ⊗2k+1 ⊗ (−|0〉〈1| ⊗ Y + |1〉〈0| ⊗ Y )
= Y ⊗2k+3.
It is known that the Eq.(4) holds according the inductive hypothesis.
When σ = Z, we prove Eq.(5) to be established. The same reason has the
next form
A(Z ⊗ I⊗n−1)A† = Z ⊗X⊗n−1, n ∈ Z+. (8)
It is easy to know that when n = 3, 5, Eq.(5) is held, so assumed that Eq.(5)
is established when n = 2k+ 1, next certificate that Eq.(5) is also established
when n = 2k + 3. According hypothesis and Eq.(8) we know that
B = W2kW2k−1 · · ·W1,
U(Z ⊗ I⊗2k)U† = Z⊗2k+1,
A′(Z ⊗ I⊗2k+2)(A′)† = Z ⊗ I⊗2k+2.
When n = 2k + 3,
U ′(Z ⊗ I⊗2k+2)(U ′)†
= B′(Z ⊗ I⊗2k+2)(B′)†
= W ′2k+2W
′
2k+1(Z
⊗2k+1 ⊗ I ⊗ I)(W ′2k+1)†(W ′2k+2)†
= Z⊗2k+1 ⊗ (|0〉〈0| ⊗ Z − |1〉〈1| ⊗ Z)
= Z⊗2k+3.
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It is known that the Eq.(5) holds according the inductive hypothesis.
To sum up: the Property 1 has to be proved.
Property 2 when n is an even number,
U(σ ⊗ I⊗n−1)U† =
{
I ⊗ σ⊗n−1, σ ∈ {I,X}
Z ⊗ σ⊗n−1, σ ∈ {Y,Z}. (9)
Prove For σ = I,X, Y, Z, we give a proof of (9) respectively. That is, we
prove the following equations are set up
U(I ⊗ I⊗n−1)U† = I⊗n. (10)
U(X ⊗ I⊗n−1)U† = I ⊗X⊗n−1. (11)
U(Y ⊗ I⊗n−1)U† = Z ⊗ Y ⊗n−1. (12)
U(Z ⊗ I⊗n−1)U† = Z ⊗ Z⊗n. (13)
Firstly, by U = BA, it is easy to know that the above Eq.(10) is clearly
established when σ = I . Next, the cases of σ = {X,Y, Z} are proved by
mathematical induction.
When σ = X, it is easy to know that when n = 2, 4, Eq.(11) is held, so we
assumed that Eq.(11) is established when n = 2k, next certificate that Eq.(11)
is also established when n = 2k+2. According hypothesis and Eq.(6) we know
that
B = W2k−1W2k−2 · · ·W1,
U(X ⊗ I⊗2k−1)U† = I ⊗X⊗2k−1,
A′(X ⊗ I⊗2k+1)(A′)† = X⊗2k+2,
when n = 2k + 2,
B′ = W ′2k+1W
′
2kW
′
2k−1W
′
2k−2 · · ·W ′1
= W ′2k+1W
′
2k(W2k−1 ⊗ I ⊗ I) · · · (W1 ⊗ I ⊗ I)
= W ′2k+1W
′
2k(W2k−1 ⊗ · · · ⊗W1 ⊗ I ⊗ I)
= W ′2k+1W
′
2k(B ⊗ I ⊗ I),
where
W ′2k = I
⊗2k ⊗ |0〉〈0| ⊗ I +X ⊗ I⊗2k−1 ⊗ |1〉〈1| ⊗ I,
W ′2k+1 = I
⊗2k ⊗ I ⊗ |0〉〈0|+X ⊗ I⊗2k−1 ⊗ I ⊗ |1〉〈1|,
then
U ′(X ⊗ I⊗2k+1)(U ′)†
= B′A′(X ⊗ I⊗2k+1)(A′)†(B′)†
= B′(X⊗2k ⊗X⊗2)(B′)†
= W ′2k+1W
′
2k(I ⊗X⊗2k+1)(W ′2k)†(W ′2k+1)†
= I ⊗X⊗2k+1.
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It is known that the Eq.(11) holds according the inductive hypothesis.
When σ = Y , it is easy to know that when n = 2, 4, Eq.(12) is held, so we
assumed that Eq.(12) is established when n = 2k, next certificate that Eq.(12)
is also established when n = 2k+2 . According hypothesis and Eq.(7) we know
that
B = W2k−1W2k−2 · · ·W1,
U(Y ⊗ I⊗2k−1)U† = Z ⊗ Y ⊗2k−1,
A′(Y ⊗ I⊗2k+1)(A′)† = Y ⊗X⊗2k+1,
when n = 2k + 2,
B′ = W ′2k+1W
′
2k(B ⊗ I ⊗ I),
then
U ′(Y ⊗ I⊗2k+1)(U ′)†
= B′A′(X ⊗ I⊗2k+1)(A′)†(B′)†
= B′(Y ⊗X⊗2k+1)(B′)†
= W ′2k+1W
′
2k(Z ⊗ Y ⊗2k−1 ⊗X⊗2)(W ′2k)†(W ′2k+1)†
= Z ⊗ Y ⊗2k+1.
It is known that the Eq.(12) holds according the inductive hypothesis.
When σ = Z, it is easy to know that when n = 2, 4, Eq.(12) is held, so we
assumed that Eq.(13) is established when n = 2k, next certificate that Eq.(13)
is also established when n = 2k+2 . According hypothesis and Eq.(8) we know
that
B = W2k−1W2k−2 · · ·W1,
U(Z ⊗ I⊗2k−1)U† = Z⊗2k,
A′(Z ⊗ I⊗2k+1)(A′)† = Z ⊗ I⊗2k+1,
when n = 2k + 2,
B′ = W ′2k+1W
′
2k(B ⊗ I ⊗ I),
then
U ′(Z ⊗ I⊗2k+1)(U ′)†
= B′A′(Z ⊗ I⊗2k+1)(A′)†(B′)†
= B′(Z ⊗ I⊗2k−1 ⊗ I⊗2)(B′)†
= W ′2k+1W
′
2k(Z
⊗2k ⊗ I⊗2)(W ′2k)†(W ′2k+1)†
= Z⊗2k+2.
It is known that the Eq.(13) holds according the inductive hypothesis.
To sum up, the Property 2 is proved.
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3 Secret sharing scheme
In the Ref.[14], an (n, n) threshold quantum secret sharing scheme is proposed,
in which the number of participants is limited to n = 4k+ 1, k ∈ Z+, and the
scheme use quantum circuits to evaluate security after the participants get
their own quantum states. In this section, we discuss the number of partici-
pants n in any case ( n ∈ Z+ ). The specific scheme is as follows:
Input procedure
The first s bits in the first column are initialized as a quantum secret, and
the later t bits are auxiliary state: |φ+〉 = UT (H1 ⊗ H2)|000〉 = 12 (|000〉 +|010〉+ |100〉+ |111〉), let s = 3k, t = 3k′, k′/k ∈ Z+. The rest of the column is
initialized to the maximum mixed state I2 , where I,X, Y, Z are common Pauli
operator, and UT is a Toffoli gate.
Encoding procedure
When x ∈ {1, 2, · · · , s}, U acts on x-th qubit Rx, so U⊗s act on s(n + 1)
bit quantum state and encodes the quantum state secret into a highly mixed
state.
Sharing procedure
Prepared U encrypted n + 1 column mixed quantum state, Alice holding
first column quantum state, y-th column quantum state send to the y − 1
participant, where y ∈ {2, 3, · · · , n+ 1}.
Decoding procedure
(a) Collecting the shared state of n+ 1 participants;
(b) The unitary matrix U† acts on the mixed quantum state shared by the
n+1 column, discards the rest of the columns, and the remaining first column
s bits are quantum state secrets.
4 Scheme analysis
In order to analyze quantum circuits acting on shared secrets, each participant
performs quantum computation on his own share only, and its computation is
carried out between sharing and decryption procedure. In Ref. [27], it is shown
that any gate in C3\C2 and Clifford group gates can form a set of universal
gate. In this paper, we consider a set of discrete gate sets consisting of Clifford
group gates and Toffoli gate. where UT = (|00〉〈00|+ |01〉〈01|+ |10〉〈10|)⊗ I +
|11〉〈11| ⊗ X. Quantum circuit consists of any multiple Clifford gates and a
constant k′/k Toffoli gates. Now we consider a sequence gate U = (U1, · · · , UL)
that acts on the s bit quantum state secret, where U1, · · · , UL gates are all
unitary and are known to the participants.
When Ui is a Clifford gate, each participant implements Ui on a list of its
own qubit subsets, so n+1 party participants jointly implement U⊗n+1i . When
Ui is a single-qubit Clifford gates, as shown in Fig.3, when Ui is a double-qubit
CNOT gate, as shown in Fig.4.
When Ui is a Toffoli gate, each participant can perform a constant k
′/k
Toffoli gates on its own quantum secret. To implement the j-th Toffoli gate
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Fig. 3: Schematic diagram
of Clifford gate action
Fig. 4: Schematic diagram of CONT
gate action
at the m,n, l bit qubit, each participant operates like Fig.5, where m,n, l ∈
{1, · · · , s}, j ∈ {1, · · · , k′/k}.
Fig. 5: Toffoli gate diagram
Here the M frame represents the measuring device, when the result is
classic bit 1, the operation in the above box is implemented, and the Toffoli
gate is finally realized. Here |x〉, |y〉, |z〉 is the quantum state of the m,n, l bit,
|φ+〉 = UT (H1 ⊗ H2)|000〉 = 12 (|000〉 + |010〉 + |100〉 + |111〉) is an auxiliary
particle. From Fig.5, it can be seen that each implementation of a Toffoli gate
consumes an auxiliary particle |φ+〉.
In order to better understand the above scheme and analyze the implemen-
tation of quantum gates on the shared quantum secret, we give two examples
of n = 4, 5.
Example Suppose that the shared quantum state secret is σ = X ⊗ Y ⊗
Z, t = 6. After the action of the unitary matrix U in the scheme, the final
state is as follows
ρ˜sec = (X ⊗ Y ⊗ Z)⊗5 ⊗ Φ,
Φ = U(|φ+〉〈φ+|⊗ (I⊗3)⊗4)U† is the result state of the auxiliary particle after
the action of the unitary matrix U . Assuming that the first three participants
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(excluding Alice) are dishonest, and the fourth participant are honest, they
trace the quantum state held by fourth participant, namely, find the reduced
density matrix corresponding to the four dimensional subsystems including
Alice
tr5(ρ˜sec) = tr5((X ⊗ Y ⊗ Z)⊗5 ⊗ Φ)
= (X ⊗ Y ⊗ Z)⊗4 ⊗ Φ′ · tr(X ⊗ Y ⊗ Z ⊗ Φ5)
= (X ⊗ Y ⊗ Z)⊗4 ⊗ Φ′ · tr(X ⊗ Y ⊗ Z) · tr(Φ5)
= (X ⊗ Y ⊗ Z)⊗4 ⊗ Φ′ · 0 · tr(Φ5)
= 0,
Φ′ is the first four column entangled states of Φ , and Φ5 is the fifth column
quantum state of Φ. The rest of the three participants and the Alice did not
get any information about the quantum secret. We consider a sequence gates
U = (C1, C2, UT1 , C3, UT2 , C4) on the s = 3 bits quantum state secret, where
C1, C2, C3, C4 are Clifford gates, UT1 and UT2 are Toffoli gates, frame UT1 and
UT2 in the diagram as in Fig.5; Each unitary gate is known to the participants.
The operations performed by each participant are shown in Fig.6.
Fig. 6: Quantum diagram of a sequence gates
Example Suppose that the shared quantum state secret is σ = X ⊗ Y ⊗
Z, t = 6. After the action of the unitary matrix U in the scheme, the final
state is as follows
ρ˜sec = (I ⊗ Z ⊗ Z)⊗ σ⊗5 ⊗ Φ,
Φ = U(|φ+〉〈φ+|⊗ (I⊗3)⊗4)U† is the result state of the auxiliary particle after
the action of the unitary matrix. Assuming that the first four participants
(excluding Alice) try to get secret information, then they trace the quantum
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state held by fourth participant, namely, find the reduced density matrix cor-
responding to the five dimensional subsystems including Alice
tr6(ρ˜sec) = tr6((I ⊗ Z ⊗ Z)⊗ σ⊗5 ⊗ Φ)
= (I ⊗ Z ⊗ Z)⊗ σ⊗4 ⊗ Φ′′ · tr(X ⊗ Y ⊗ Z ⊗ Φ′5)
= (I ⊗ Z ⊗ Z)⊗ σ⊗4 ⊗ Φ′′ · 0 · tr(Φ5)
= 0.
Φ′′ is the first four column entangled states of Φ , and Φ′5 is the sixth column
quantum state of Φ. The rest of the four participants and the Alice did not
get any information about the quantum secret. In the same way, we consider
a sequence gates U = (C1, C2, UT1 , C3, UT2 , C4) on the s = 3 bits quantum
state secret, each unitary gate is known to the participants. The operations
performed by each participant are shown in Fig.6.
5 Security discussion
Dishonest participants attack: A (k, n)-threshold quantum secret
sharing scheme satisfies two properties: (1) any k or more parties can per-
fectly reconstruct the secret quantum state, (2) any k− 1 or fewer parties can
collectively deduce no information at all about the secret quantum state. In
this paper, when k = n the first property is clearly hold, it can be seen that
the coding program is completely reversible in the encryption phase. Next, we
discuss the second property. The secret quantum state before encrypting is
ρsec = 2
−s ∑
σ∈P⊗s
ωσσ, (14)
where σ = σ1 ⊗ σ2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σs, P = {I,X, Y, Z}; it is coefficient ωσ for the
non-trivial Pauli oprators σ in P⊗s, and ωσ = 1 when σ is the trivial Pauli
oprator.
When n + 1 is odd, it is known by the Property 1 that the final state of
the encrypted post is
ρ˜sec = 2
−s(
∑
σ∈P⊗s
ωσσ
⊗n+1)⊗ Φ. (15)
Φ = U(|φ+〉〈φ+| ⊗ (I⊗3)⊗n)U†. Assuming that the y-th participant is honest,
the other n − 1 participants can not get any information about the quantum
secret, because we can get the reduced density matrix on the n dimension
subsystem by tracing the quantum state held by the y-th participant
ρ˜sec = 2
−s(
∑
σ∈P⊗s
ωσσ
⊗n+1)⊗ Φ
= 2−s((I⊗s)⊗n+1 +
∑
σ∈P⊗s\I⊗s
ωσσ
⊗n+1)⊗ Φ,
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where
try+1(
∑
σ∈P⊗s\I⊗s
ωσσ
⊗n+1) =
∑
σ∈P⊗s\I⊗s
ωσtry+1(σ
⊗n+1) = 0,
then
try+1{2−s((I⊗s)⊗n+1 +
∑
σ∈P⊗s\I⊗s
ωσσ
⊗n+1)}
= 2−s{try+1(I⊗s)⊗n+1 + 0}
= (I⊗s)⊗n.
When n + 1 is even, it is known by the Property 2 that the final state of
the encrypted is
ρ˜sec = 2
−s(
∑
σ∈P⊗s
ωσθ ⊗ σ⊗n)⊗ Φ.
Φ = U(|φ+〉〈φ+|⊗(I⊗3)⊗n)U†. Where θ is the product state of the first column
of quantum bits held by Alice. Similarly, assuming that the y-th participant
is honest, the other n − 1 participants can not get any information about
the quantum secret, because we can get the reduced density matrix on the n
dimension subsystem by tracing the quantum state held by the y-th participant
ρ˜sec = 2
−s(
∑
σ∈P⊗s
ωσθ ⊗ σ⊗n)⊗ Φ
= 2−s(θ ⊗ (I⊗s)⊗n +
∑
σ∈P⊗s\I⊗s
ωσθ ⊗ σ⊗n)⊗ Φ.
Where
try+1(
∑
σ∈P⊗s\I⊗s
ωσθ ⊗ σ⊗n) =
∑
σ∈P⊗s\I⊗s
ωσθ ⊗ try(σ⊗n) = 0,
then
try+1{2−s(
∑
σ∈P⊗s
ωσθ ⊗ σ⊗n)}
= try+1{2−s(θ ⊗ (I⊗s)⊗n +
∑
σ∈P⊗s\I⊗s
ωσθ ⊗ σ⊗n)}
= 2−s{θ ⊗ try(I⊗s)⊗n +
∑
σ∈P⊗s\I⊗s
ωσθ ⊗ try(σ⊗n)}
= θ ⊗ (I⊗s)⊗n−1.
In the two cases, the dishonest participant can only get a highly mixed state,
so there is no information about the quantum secret.
Second property is also satisfied when the set of discrete gates composed
of Clifford group gates and Toffoli gate act on shared quantum state secret.
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Suppose that only one of the n participants is honest, while the remaining
n − 1 participants can perform any operation, which proves that the result
of the honest party’s announcement is uniformly random and independent of
the behavior of other participants [14]. According to the effect of the gate
evaluation, after the evaluation of the i-th gate the state of the system has the
form
ρi =
∑
biψAlice ⊗ (σ ⊗ γ
2N
)⊗ χi. (16)
where σ ∈ P⊗s, γ is an auxiliary particle that is not destroyed, bi is a set of
ccalars, ψAlice is a column of quantum states held by Alice, and χi is a set of
operators on the dishonest parties system. Honesty and other systems exist in
the form of the product state, therefore, the results of the honest measure do
not convey any useful information .
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have constructed an (n, n) threshold quantum secret sharing
scheme for n with arbitrary number (n ∈ Z+) of participants, which is based on
a quantum circuit composed of Clifford group gates and Toffoli gate. Because
of the universal quantum logic gate has different forms, looking for general
quantum gate model set and consider other types of universal quantum circuit
gate construction, and more secure quantum secret sharing scheme based on
these quantum circuits is a problem to be studied in the future.
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